Christopher L. Elliott retired from the British Army as a Major General in 2002. This book was written over two years while Elliott was a research fellow at the universities of Oxford and Reading.
Long overdue, 'High Command' is a study of what's wrong at the MoD,
and an excellent primer for the Chilcot report. . . . Elliott sets
out an agenda for reform as well as a narrative. He does so in
terms that Evelyn Waugh could not have bettered.
*The Spectator*
Britain will lose more wars unless military chiefs stop agreeing to
impossible missions after a decade of errors in Iraq and
Afghanistan, a new book warns... High Command, based on interviews
with many of those at the helm of the military and the Ministry of
Defence from the turn of the century, also identifies fundamental
flaws inside the ministry that set the conditions for failure...
Offering a rare insight into the turmoil within the armed forces
during one of the most critical decisions of the two wars -- the
deployment of British forces to Helmand in 2006 when they were
still fighting in southern Iraq.
*Deborah Haynes, Defence Editor, The Times*
Enthralling, gripping and brutally honest . . . With a gentle,
skilful hand Elliott guides the reader through the complex world of
'High Command' to explain why a valiant and well-trained military
force was not afforded the proper conditions to succeed -- neither
in resources nor in leadership at a political level.
*General Jack Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff, United States
Army*
It is the responsibility of the chiefs of staff to speak truth to
power when Britain goes to war. However, until now they have been
accorded little attention in the controversies generated by the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Christopher Elliott has put that
right, combining an insider's perspective with shrewdness, wit and
strategic insight. If we are to learn lessons from the last decade,
this is where to begin.
*Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War,
University of Oxford*
This is a diplomatically couched bombshell of criticism of UK
decision-making and the conduct of war. A must-read for any
journalist and student of IR, strategy, decision-making processes,
and organisational psychology, it should be on every reading list
right up there with Graham Allison's Essence of Decision. The UK
MoD, and Defence Ministries the world over, should reflect on
General Elliott's trenchant analysis and wise advice, lest lives
and treasure continue to be wasted in ineffective or even
counter-productive campaigns.
*Professor Beatrice Heuser, University of Reading*
'High Command' is a clear and balanced account of the strategic
direction - and lack of it - in British operations over the past
fifteen years. Christopher Elliott brings depressing evidence of
gross institutional failure and indicates what should be done to
make 'the machinery of government at war' fit for purpose. A well
written book and extremely relevant to our times as yet another
generation is busy involving us once again in the Middle East.
*General Sir Rupert Smith KCB DSO OBE QGM former Deputy Supreme
Allied Commander Europe*
Elliott has provided the ideal primer for the Chilcot report,
whenever it arrives. One of his best suggestions is the need for
better education for senior offices, to the level of their American
peers, particularly in human and political geography.
*Robert Fox, The World Today*
An outstanding book on British military leadership in the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars.
*Changing Character of War, Oxford University*
Elliott is particularly well qualified to shine a light on the
performance of the 'High Command' and does so with highly rigorous
analysis, shrewd observations and perceptive insights. A compelling
and disquieting account.
*Lieutenant General (retired) Sir John Kiszely KCB MC, former
Director of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom*
An impressively original work. Elliott authoritatively describes
the blindness and blunders committed by Britain's politicians,
civil servants and the military before and after the invasion of
Iraq and exposes how the lessons of failure in Iraq were ignored
during the venture into Helmand
*Tom Bower, writer and journalist*
A very welcome present this Christmas was a copy of Major General
(Retd) Christopher Elliott's book, 'High Command', about British
Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. . . . An
extremely well written and thoughtful book it examines the causes
of these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the
challenges that they presented.
*Salisbury Journal*
[Elliott] is meticulous in setting out . . . who was who in key
military positions during this period, the structures within which
they were working and, based on interviews, their opinions on how
'the system' worked . . . Also, commendably, he concludes with some
practical suggestions as to how the system might be changed for the
better.
*Asian Affairs*
|
Ask a Question About this Product More... |
|
