Promotional Information

In Against Obligation, Abner Greene upends conventional wisdom about several fundamental political questions. Why and when must people obey the law? What does religious freedom require in a liberal democratic state? Must judges and citizens respect historical views about constitutional meaning? Smart, ambitious, provocative, and original--this tightly argued and broad-ranging book compels readers to reexamine basic assumptions about political obligation, constitutional democracy, and religious freedom. -- Christopher Eisgruber, Princeton University Against Obligation is one of the finest contributions to constitutional theory in recent years. Abner Greene shows the connections between questions of political and interpretive obligation in this remarkably incisive work. His arguments against the leading justifications of political and interpretive obligation are vigorous and fair. And his arguments for the multiple sources of obligation and interpretive authority in a liberal democracy are creative, normatively attractive, and deeply grounded in a powerful account of our constitutional order. -- James E. Fleming, Boston University

About the Author

Abner S. Greene is Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law at Fordham University.

Reviews

In Against Obligation, Abner Greene upends conventional wisdom about several fundamental political questions. Why and when must people obey the law? What does religious freedom require in a liberal democratic state? Must judges and citizens respect historical views about constitutional meaning? Smart, ambitious, provocative, and original-this tightly argued and broad-ranging book compels readers to reexamine basic assumptions about political obligation, constitutional democracy, and religious freedom. -- Christopher Eisgruber, Princeton University
Against Obligation is one of the finest contributions to constitutional theory in recent years. Abner Greene shows the connections between questions of political and interpretive obligation in this remarkably incisive work. His arguments against the leading justifications of political and interpretive obligation are vigorous and fair. And his arguments for the multiple sources of obligation and interpretive authority in a liberal democracy are creative, normatively attractive, and deeply grounded in a powerful account of our constitutional order. -- James E. Fleming, Boston University