Acknowledgements
Synopsis
1: The Background
2: Procedural Rationality and Belief Ascription
3: Epistemic Rationality and Belief Ascription
4: Agential Rationality and Belief Ascription
5: Beliefs and Self Knowledge
6: Conclusions
Bibliography and Reference List
Lisa Bortolotti is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University
of Birmingham (UK). Her main research interests are in the
philosophy of the cognitive sciences and in the intersection
between philosophy of mind and ethics. She has published a number
of articles on belief ascription, rationality and delusions in
journals such as Mind & Language and Philosophical Psychology. She
is the author of An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science for
Polity
Press, the editor of Philosophy and Happiness for Palgrave and the
co-editor (with M.R. Broome) of Psychiatry as Cognitive
Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives for Oxford University
Press.
`This book is an important contribution to the recent delusion
debate. The book can also usefully work as a cognitive science
textbook on delusion. The author introduces the topic in depth,
covering all the right issues in a way that no one has done before.
The bibliography is also an extremely rich guide for those
interested in further exploring the subject, and also for finding
sources relevant to disputes in the philosophy of mind.'
Elisabetta Sirgiovanni, HumanaMente
One of the most important works on delusions is Bortolotti's
Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs, a book that examines the
core features of delusions in relation to other mental states,
demonstrating that many non-delusional beliefs are not so rational
and delusions often differ in degree, rather than kind, from other,
non-pathological, beliefs.
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