Contents:
Introduction Michael Waldman
PART I CLASSICS
1. Michael Spence (1973), ‘Job Market Signaling’, 87 (3), Quarterly
Journal of Economics, August, 355–74
2. Boyan Jovanovic (1979), ‘Job Matching and the Theory of
Turnover’, Journal of Political Economy, 87 (5), Part 1, October,
972–90
3. Eugene F. Fama (1980), ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm’, Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), April, 288–307
4. Michael Waldman (1984), ‘Job Assignments, Signaling and
Efficiency’, Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (2), Summer, 255-67
5. Bruce C. Greenwald (1986), ‘Adverse Selection in the Labour
Market’, Review of Economic Studies, 53 (3), July, 325-47
6. Bengt Holmstrom (1999), ‘Managerial Incentive Problems: A
Dynamic Perspective’, Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1), January,
169-82
PART II EDUCATION
7. John G. Riley (1979), ‘Testing the Educational Screening
Hypothesis,’ Journal of Political Economy, 87 (5), Part 2:
Education and Income, October, S227–S252
8. Kevin Lang and David Kropp (1986), ‘Human Capital Versus
Sorting: The Effects of Compulsory Attendance Laws’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 101 (3), August, 609–24
9. Thomas Hungerford and Gary Solon (1987), ‘Sheepskin Effects in
the Returns to Education’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 69
(1), February, 175–7
10. Kelly Bedard (2001),’Human Capital versus Signaling Models:
University Access and High School Dropouts’, Journal of Political
Economy, 109 (4), 749–75
11. Fabian Lange (2007), ‘The Speed of Employer Learning’, Journal
of Labor Economics, 25 (1), 1–35
12. Peter Arcidiacono, Patrick Bayer and Aurel Hizmo (2010),
‘Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation
of Ability,’ American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (4),
October, 76–104
PART III THEORY OF SYMMETRIC LEARNING
13. Milton Harris and Bengt Holmstrom (1982), ‘A Theory of Wage
Dynamics’, Review of Economic Studies, 49 (3), July, 315–33
14. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman (1999), ‘A Theory of Wage
and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 114 (4), November, 1321–358
15. Jaime Ortega (2001), ‘Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism’,
Management Science, 47 (10), October, 1361–70
16. Edward P. Lazear (2004), ‘The Peter Principle: A Theory of
Decline’, Journal of Political Economy, 112 (1) Part 2,
S141–S163
PART IV EVIDENCE ON SYMMETRIC LEARNING
17. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1992), ‘Optimal Incentive
Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence’,
Journal of Political Economy, 100 (3), June, 468–505
18. Curtis J. Simon and John T. Warner (1992), ‘Matchmaker,
Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality,
Earnings and Tenure’, Journal of Labor Economics, 10 (3), July,
306–30
19. Henry S. Farber and Robert Gibbons (1996), ‘Learning and Wage
Dynamics’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (4), November,
1007–47
20. Joseph G. Altonji and Charles R. Pierret (2001), ‘Employer
Learning and Statistical Discrimination’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116 (1), February, 313–50
21. Lisa B. Kahn and Fabian Lange (2014) ‘Employer Learning,
Productivity, and the Earnings Distribution: Evidence from
Performance Measures’, Review of Economic Studies, 81, 1575–613
22. Amanda Pallais (2014), ‘Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor
Markets’, American Economic Review, 104 (11), 3565–99
23. Jeanine Miklós-Thal and Hannes Ullrich (2016), ‘Career
Prospects and Effort Incentives: Evidence from Professional
Soccer’, Management Science, 62 (6), 1645–67
PART V THEORY OF ASYMMETRIC LEARNING
24. Paul Milgrom and Sharon Oster (1987), ‘Job Discrimination,
Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis’, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, CII (3), August, 453–76
25. James D. Montgomery (1991), ‘Social Networks and Labor-Market
Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis’, American Economic Review,
81, (5), December, 1408–418
26. Dan Bernhardt (1995) ‘Strategic Promotion and Compensation’,
Review of Economic Studies, 62 (2), April, 315–39
27. Chun Chang and Yijiang Wang (1996), ‘Human Capital Investment
under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited ’,
Journal of Labor Economics, 14 (3), July, 505–19
28. Ján Zábojník and Dan Bernhardt (2001), ‘Corporate Tournaments,
Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Relation’, Review
of Economic Studies, 68 (3), 693–716
29. Hideo Owan (2004), ‘Promotion, Turnover, Earnings, and
Firm-Sponsored Training’, Journal of Labor Economics, 22 (4),
October, 955–78
PART VI EVIDENCE FROM ASYMMETRIC LEARNING
30. Robert Gibbons and Lawrence F. Katz (1991), ‘Layoffs and
Lemons’, Journal of Labor Economics, 9 (4), October, 351–80
31. Daron Acemoglu and Jorn -Steffen Pischke (1998) ‘Why do Firms
Train? Theory and Evidence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113
(1), February, 79–119
32. Uta Schönberg (2007), ‘Testing for Asymmetric Employer
Learning’, Journal of Labor Economics, 25 (4), October, 651–91
33. Joshua C. Pinkston (2009), ‘A Model of Asymmetric Employer
Learning with Testable Implications’, Review of Economic Studies,
76 (1), January, 367–94
34. Jed DeVaro and Michael Waldman (2012), ‘The Signaling Role of
Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence’, Journal of
Labor Economics, 30 (1), January, 91–147
35. Lisa B. Kahn (2013), ‘Asymmetric Information Between
Employers’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5 (4),
October, 165–205
Index
Edited by Michael Waldman, Charles H. Dyson Professor in Management and Professor of Economics, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, US
‘Any scholar interested in career patterns of employees in
organizations should consult this collection. It combines in one
volume a comprehensive collection of seminal articles in economics
that analyze the processes of learning about employees‘ talents and
its implications for educational choices, promotion decisions and
salary structures in firms. It demonstrates how powerful
microeconomic analysis has become to help us develop a precise
understanding of careers within and across organizations.’
*Dirk Sliwka, University of Cologne, Germany*
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