Farhang is at the forefront of a new generation of scholars who have begun to broaden the parameters of the American state and its reach into society. Drawing upon an impressive range of methods, sources, and theory, Farhang shows us how Congress and the administration extended the reach of regulation by inducing private litigants and the legal profession to cocreate a vast regulatory regime. A shrewd reading of the new mode of state-building. -- Dan Carpenter, Harvard University This book is a major advance in the understanding of American government. Farhang demonstrates that America's distinctive reliance on adversarial legalism to enforce civil rights does not reflect a power grab by lawyers and judges. Instead, it stems from deliberate Congressional choices, in the face of political polarization, to use private litigation to protect individual rights. -- Robert A. Kagan, University of California, Berkeley Private enforcement of statutory provisions is an enormously significant aspect of our political system and economy, yet researchers have largely ignored this issue. This seminal and important book exhaustively analyzes the theory behind private enforcement and persuasively sets out the history of its intentional creation as a tool of regulation. -- Frank Cross, University of Texas, Austin This is an expertly executed, rigorous, and innovative book about American political development. With a commanding, multidisciplinary approach, Farhang develops the concepts of state fragmentation and capacity, and brings a sophisticated understanding of ideology to the discussion. -- John Skrentny, University of California, San Diego This is an exceptionally well-crafted, clearly argued, and illuminating book on the growing use of private litigation as a regulatory tool. Farhang's crisply framed analysis crosses subfields of American politics and shows how Democrats and Republicans collaborated to turn U.S. policy toward a reliance on litigation. -- Charles Epp, University of Kansas
Illustrations and Tables ix Acknowledgments xi Part I: Private Enforcement Regimes in General Chapter 1: An Introduction to Private Enforcement Regimes 3 Chapter 2: Institutional Foundations of Private Enforcement Regimes 19 Chapter 3: An Empirical Model of Enactment of Private Enforcement Regimes 60 Part II: Private Enforcement Regimes and Civil Rights Introduction to Part II 85 Chapter 4: Foundations: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 94 Chapter 5: Reverberations: 1965-1976 129 Chapter 6: Escalation: The Civil Rights Act of 1991 172 Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications 214 Notes 235 Index 293
Sean Farhang is assistant professor in the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley.
Winner of the 2011 C. Herman Pritchett Award, Law and Courts Section of the American Political Science Association Winner of the 2011 Gladys M. Kammerer Award, American Political Science Association
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