Major General Kenneth L Privratsky served in the US Infantry in Vietnam before becoming a logistics specialist. He taught at West Point and commanded organizations supplying US Forces worldwide. He was a military fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. In civilian life he was an executive in the ocean transportation industry. He writes and lectures regularly. He lives in Alaska.
'Logistics in the Falklands War' is, in short, a thorough account
of how the British hastily improvised a task force to recapture
lost territory. It shows how doing that was achieved by
coordinating civilian and military assets and integrating the
civilian assets into a military organization; it reveals the
complexities of managing logistics afloat and ashore and of
integrating fundamentally different methodologies; finally, it
demonstrates that expeditionary forces, in whatever environment
they may deploy, must be self-sustaining, for the logistical line
becomes more and more tenuous as the distance from the home base
increases. As Privratsky presents the story, one may wonder at the
British achievement but also draw discomforting lessons for the
present.-- "Australian Naval Institute"
"a timely book that explores the logistical challenges of
projecting decisive combat power across transoceanic distances. As
America's Joint force explores new ways of leveraging technology to
counter aggression from a distance, this book dispels any
misunderstanding about the magnitude of the challenges that
supplying war across great distances creates. At the end of the
day, projecting and sustaining combat power for conflict and
post-conflict operations is a logistical undertaking requiring
foresight, planning, C2, and extensive logistical preparation of
the battle space. A country's operational reach is ultimately
determined by its' military effectiveness in projecting and
sustaining combat power--which is all about logistics."-- "Marine
Corps Gazette"
"a very accurate report about the course of 'The Conflict', like
the British call it. The book gives a good insight in the decision
process, at the Argentinian as well as at the British side, which
lead to the armed battle of these islands. What interested me most
is how the British came to it to decide, almost overnight, to begin
a war and also, within 48 hours (promised by the British Navy)
actually sailed out... a broad, interesting and subtle picture of
the events that took place"-- "Aviation Book Reviews"
"highlights the importance of the integration of combat operations
and logistics ..... argues convincingly that logistics was the
center of gravity of the campaign... thorough research, including
interviews leads to a comprehensive description of the combat
operations and movement of supplies and equipment from the
amphibious landing zone on the west shore of East Falkland on D-Day
21 May 1982, to the surrender on 14 June 1982... Privatsky's
insights could also be applied to humanitarian affairs operations,
especially if a natural disaster has destroyed piers or off loading
equipment, or occurred in a remote location without pre positioned
stores. Military operational planners and military history
enthusiasts should add this book to their professional library"--
"Naval War College Review, Spring 2016"
"With inadequate training, little intelligence, no contingency
plan, a politically driven rush and at 8,000 miles, it is not
surprising that logistics during Op CORPORATE were confusing and
challenging. It has taken a US Army general to explain why. We
should all be grateful."--Michael Clapp, Commander Amphibious Task
Force
|
Ask a Question About this Product More... |
|
