Part 1 Introduction to Microeconomics Chapter 1 Analyzing Economic Problems 1 Microeconomics and Climate Change 1.1 Why Study Microeconomics? 4 1.2 Three Key Analytical Tools 5 Constrained Optimization 6 Equilibrium Analysis 12 Comparative Statics 13 1.3 Positive and Normative Analysis 18 Chapter 2 Demand and Supply Analysis 26 What Gives with the Price of Corn? 2.1 Demand, Supply, and Market Equilibrium 29 Demand Curves 30 Supply Curves 32 Market Equilibrium 33 Shifts in Supply and Demand 35 2.2 Price Elasticity of Demand 45 Elasticities Along Specific Demand Curves 47 Price Elasticity of Demand and Total Revenue 49 Determinants of the Price Elasticity of Demand 50 Market-Level versus Brand-Level Price Elasticities of Demand 51 2.3 Other Elasticities 53 Income Elasticity of Demand 53 Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand 54 Price Elasticity of Supply 56 2.4 Elasticity in the Long Run versus the Short Run 56 Greater Elasticity in the Long Run Than in the Short Run 56 Greater Elasticity in the Short Run Than in the Long Run 58 2.5 Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations 59 Fitting Linear Demand Curves Using Quantity, Price, and Elasticity Information 60 Identifying Supply and Demand Curves on the Back of an Envelope 61 Identifying the Price Elasticity of Demand from Shifts in Supply 63 Appendix Price Elasticity of Demand Along a Constant Elasticity Demand Curve 74 Part 2 Consumer Theory Chapter 3 Consumer Preferences and the Concept of Utility 75 Why Do You Like What You Like? 3.1 Representations of Preferences 77 Assumptions About Consumer Preferences 77 Ordinal and Cardinal Ranking 79 3.2 Utility Functions 80 Preferences with a Single Good: The Concept of Marginal Utility 80 Preferences with Multiple Goods: Marginal Utility, Indifference Curves, and the Marginal Rate of Substitution 84 3.3 Special Preferences 95 Perfect Substitutes 95 Perfect Complements 96 The Cobb-Douglas Utility Function 97 Quasilinear Utility Functions 98 Chapter 4 Consumer Choice 105 How Much of What You Like Should You Buy? 4.1 The Budget Constraint 107 How Does a Change in Income Affect the Budget Line? 109 How Does a Change in Price Affect the Budget Line? 109 4.2 Optimal Choice 112 Using the Tangency Condition to Understand When a Basket is Not Optimal 116 Finding an Optimal Consumption Basket 117 Two Ways of Thinking About Optimality 118 Corner Points 120 4.3 Consumer Choice with Composite Goods 123 Application: Coupons and Cash Subsidies 123 Application: Joining a Club 127 Application: Borrowing and Lending 128 Application: Quantity Discounts 133 4.4 Revealed Preference 134 Are Observed Choices Consistent with Utility Maximization? 135 Appendix 1 The Mathematics of Consumer Choice 145 Appendix 2 The Time Value of Money 146 Chapter 5 The Theory of Demand 152 Why Understanding the Demand for Cigarettes is Important for Public Policy 5.1 Optimal Choice and Demand 154 The Effects of a Change in Price 154 The Effects of a Change in Income 157 The Effects of a Change in Price or Income: An Algebraic Approach 162 5.2 Change in the Price of a Good: Substitution Effect and Income Effect 164 The Substitution Effect 165 The Income Effect 165 Income and Substitution Effects When Goods are Not Normal 167 5.3 Change in the Price of a Good: The Concept of Consumer Surplus 175 Understanding Consumer Surplus from the Demand Curve 175 Understanding Consumer Surplus from the Optimal Choice Diagram: Compensating Variation and Equivalent Variation 177 5.4 Market Demand 184 Market Demand with Network Externalities 186 5.5 The Choice of Labor and Leisure 189 As Wages Rise, Leisure First Decreases, Then Increases 189 The Backward-Bending Supply of Labor 191 5.6 Consumer Price Indices 195 Part 3 Production and Cost Theory Chapter 6 Inputs and Production Functions 204 Can They Do It Better and Cheaper? 6.1 Introduction to Inputs and Production Functions 206 6.2 Production Functions with a Single Input 208 Total Product Functions 209 Marginal and Average Product 210 Relationship Between Marginal and Average Product 214 6.3 Production Functions with More Than One Input 214 Total Product and Marginal Product with Two Inputs 214 Isoquants 216 Economic and Uneconomic Regions of Production 220 Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution 221 6.4 Substitutability Among Inputs 223 Describing a Firm's Input Substitution Opportunities Graphically 224 Elasticity of Substitution 226 Special Production Functions 229 6.5 Returns to Scale 234 Definitions 234 Returns to Scale versus Diminishing Marginal Returns 237 6.6 Technological Progress 237 Appendix The Elasticity of Substitution for a Cobb-Douglas Production Function 247 Chapter 7 Costs and Cost Minimization 249 What's Behind the Self-Service Revolution? 7.1 Cost Concepts for Decision Making 251 Opportunity Cost 251 Economic versus Accounting Costs 254 Sunk (Unavoidable) versus Nonsunk (Avoidable) Costs 255 7.2 The Cost-Minimization Problem 257 Long Run versus Short Run 257 The Long-Run Cost-Minimization Problem 258 Isocost Lines 259 Graphical Characterization of the Solution to the Long-Run Cost-Minimization Problem 260 Corner Point Solutions 262 7.3 Comparative Statics Analysis of the Cost-Minimization Problem 264 Comparative Statics Analysis of Changes in Input Prices 264 Comparative Statics Analysis of Changes in Output 268 Summarizing the Comparative Statics Analysis: The Input Demand Curves 269 The Price Elasticity of Demand for Inputs 271 7.4 Short-Run Cost Minimization 273 Characterizing Costs in the Short Run 274 Cost Minimization in the Short Run 276 Comparative Statics: Short-Run Input Demand versus Long-Run Input Demand 277 More Than One Variable Input in the Short Run 278 Appendix Advanced Topics in Cost Minimization 285 Chapter 8 Cost Curves 289 How Can HiSense Get a Handle on Costs? 8.1 Long-Run Cost Curves 291 Long-Run Total Cost Curve 291 How Does the Long-Run Total Cost Curve Shift When Input Prices Change? 293 Long-Run Average and Marginal Cost Curves 296 8.2 Short-Run Cost Curves 306 Short-Run Total Cost Curve 306 Relationship Between the Long-Run and the Short-Run Total Cost Curves 307 Short-Run Average and Marginal Cost Curves 309 Relationships Between the Long-Run and the Short-Run Average and Marginal Cost Curves 310 When are Long-Run and Short-Run Average and Marginal Costs Equal, and When are They Not? 311 8.3 Special Topics in Cost 314 Economies of Scope 314 Economies of Experience: The Experience Curve 317 8.4 Estimating Cost Functions 319 Constant Elasticity Cost Function 320 Translog Cost Function 320 Appendix Shephard's Lemma and Duality 327 Part 4 Perfect Competition Chapter 9 Perfectly Competitive Markets 331 A Rose is a Rose is a Rose 9.1 What is Perfect Competition? 333 9.2 Profit Maximization by a Price-Taking Firm 336 Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit 336 The Profit-Maximizing Output Choice for a Price-Taking Firm 338 9.3 How the Market Price is Determined: Short-Run Equilibrium 341 The Price-Taking Firm's Short-Run Cost Structure 341 Short-Run Supply Curve for a Price-Taking Firm When All Fixed Costs are Sunk 343 Short-Run Supply Curve for a Price-Taking Firm When Some Fixed Costs are Sunk and Some are Nonsunk 345 Short-Run Market Supply Curve 349 Short-Run Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium 352 Comparative Statics Analysis of the Short-Run Equilibrium 353 9.4 How the Market Price is Determined: Long-Run Equilibrium 356 Long-Run Output and Plant-Size Adjustments by Established Firms 356 The Firm's Long-Run Supply Curve 357 Free Entry and Long-Run Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium 358 Long-Run Market Supply Curve 360 Constant-Cost, Increasing-Cost, and Decreasing-Cost Industries 362 What Does Perfect Competition Teach Us? 370 9.5 Economic Rent and Producer Surplus 371 Economic Rent 371 Producer Surplus 374 Economic Profit, Producer Surplus, Economic Rent 380 Appendix Profit Maximization Implies Cost Minimization 388 Chapter 10 Competitive Markets: Applications 390 Is Support a Good Thing? 10.1 The Invisible Hand, Excise Taxes and Subsidies 392 The Invisible Hand 393 Excise Taxes 394 Incidence of a Tax 398 Subsidies 402 10.2 Price Ceilings and Floors 404 Price Ceilings 405 Price Floors 412 10.3 Production Quotas 417 10.4 Price Supports in the Agricultural Sector 421 Acreage Limitation Programs 422 Government Purchase Programs 422 10.5 Import Quotas and Tariffs 426 Quotas 426 Tariffs 429 Part 5 Market Power Chapter 11 Monopoly and Monopsony 442 Why Do Firms Play Monopoly? 11.1 Profit Maximization by a Monopolist 444 The Profit-Maximization Condition 444 A Closer Look at Marginal Revenue: Marginal Units and Inframarginal Units 448 Average Revenue and Marginal Revenue 449 The Profit-Maximization Condition Shown Graphically 451 A Monopolist Does Not Have a Supply Curve 453 11.2 The Importance of Price Elasticity of Demand 454 Price Elasticity of Demand and the Profit-Maximizing Price 454 Marginal Revenue and Price Elasticity of Demand 455 Marginal Cost and Price Elasticity of Demand: The Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule 457 The Monopolist Always Produces on the Elastic Region of the Market Demand Curve 458 The IEPR Applies Not Only to Monopolists 460 Quantifying Market Power: The Lerner Index 461 11.3 Comparative Statics for Monopolists 462 Shifts in Market Demand 462 Shifts in Marginal Cost 465 11.4 Monopoly with Multiple Plants and Markets 467 Output Choice with Two Plants 467 Output Choice with Two Markets 469 Profit Maximization by a Cartel 470 11.5 The Welfare Economics of Monopoly 473 The Monopoly Equilibrium Differs from the Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium 473 Monopoly Deadweight Loss 475 Rent-Seeking Activities 475 11.6 Why Do Monopoly Markets Exist? 475 Natural Monopoly 476 Barriers to Entry 477 11.7 Monopsony 479 The Monopsonist's Profit-Maximization Condition 479 An Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule for Monopsony 481 Monopsony Deadweight Loss 482 Chapter 12 Capturing Surplus 489 Why Did Your Carpet or Your Airline Ticket Cost So Much Less Than Mine? 12.1 Capturing Surplus 491 12.2 First-Degree Price Discrimination: Making the Most from Each Consumer 494 12.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination: Quantity Discounts 499 Block Pricing 499 Subscription and Usage Charges 502 12.4 Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Different Prices for Different Market Segments 505 Two Different Segments, Two Different Prices 505 Screening 508 Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Capacity Constraints 510 Implementing the Scheme of Price Discrimination: Building "Fences" 512 12.5 Tying (Tie-In Sales) 516 Bundling 517 Mixed Bundling 519 12.6 Advertising 522 Part 6 Imperfect Competition and Strategic Behavior Chapter 13 Market Structure and Competition 532 Is Competition Always the Same? If Not, Why Not? 13.1 Describing and Measuring Market Structure 534 13.2 Oligopoly with Homogeneous Products 537 The Cournot Model of Oligopoly 537 The Bertrand Model of Oligopoly 545 Why are the Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Different? 547 The Stackelberg Model of Oligopoly 548 13.3 Dominant Firm Markets 550 13.4 Oligopoly with Horizontally Differentiated Products 553 What is Product Differentiation? 553 Bertrand Price Competition with Horizontally Differentiated Products 556 13.5 Monopolistic Competition 562 Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium in Monopolistically Competitive Markets 562 Price Elasticity of Demand, Margins, and Number of Firms in the Market 564 Do Prices Fall When More Firms Enter? 564 Appendix The Cournot Equilibrium and the Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule 574 13.1 Computing a Cournot Equilibrium 540 13.2 Computing the Cournot Equilibrium for Two or More Firms with Linear Demand 544 13.3 Computing the Equilibrium in the Dominant Firm Model 552 13.4 Computing a Bertrand Equilibrium with Horizontally Differentiated Products 560 Chapter 14 Game Theory and Strategic Behavior 575 What's in a Game? 14.1 The Concept of Nash Equilibrium 577 A Simple Game 577 The Nash Equilibrium 578 The Prisoners' Dilemma 578 Dominant and Dominated Strategies 579 Games with More Than One Nash Equilibrium 583 Mixed Strategies 586 Summary: How to Find All the Nash Equilibria in a Simultaneous-Move Game with Two Players 588 14.2 The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 588 14.3 Sequential-Move Games and Strategic Moves 594 Analyzing Sequential-Move Games 594 The Strategic Value of Limiting One's Options 597 Part 7 Special Topics Chapter 15 Risk and Information 608 Risky Business 15.1 Describing Risky Outcomes 610 Lotteries and Probabilities 610 Expected Value 612 Variance 612 15.2 Evaluating Risky Outcomes 615 Utility Functions and Risk Preferences 615 Risk-Neutral and Risk-Loving Preferences 618 15.3 Bearing and Eliminating Risk 621 Risk Premium 621 When Would a Risk-Averse Person Choose to Eliminate Risk? The Demand for Insurance 624 Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 627 15.4 Analyzing Risky Decisions 633 Decision Tree Basics 633 Decision Trees with a Sequence of Decisions 635 The Value of Information 637 15.5 Auctions 639 Types of Auctions and Bidding Environments 640 Auctions When Bidders Have Private Values 641 Auctions When Bidders Have Common Values: The Winner's Curse 645 Chapter 16 General Equilibrium Theory 654 How Do Gasoline Taxes Affect the Economy? 16.1 General Equilibrium Analysis: Two Markets 656 16.2 General Equilibrium Analysis: Many Markets 660 The Origins of Supply and Demand in a Simple Economy 660 The General Equilibrium in Our Simple Economy 666 Walras' Law 670 16.3 General Equilibrium Analysis: Comparative Statics 671 16.4 The Efficiency of Competitive Markets 675 What is Economic Efficiency? 675 Exchange Efficiency 676 Input Efficiency 682 Substitution Efficiency 684 Pulling the Analysis Together: The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics 687 16.5 Gains from Free Trade 688 Free Trade is Mutually Beneficial 688 Comparative Advantage 692 Appendix Deriving the Demand and Supply Curves for General Equilibrium in Figure 16.9 and Learning-by-Doing Exercise 16.2 698 Chapter 17 Externalities and Public Goods 703 When Does the Invisible Hand Fail? 17.1 Introduction 705 17.2 Externalities 706 Negative Externalities and Economic Efficiency 708 Positive Externalities and Economic Efficiency 722 Property Rights and the Coase Theorem 726 17.3 Public Goods 728 Efficient Provision of a Public Good 729 The Free-Rider Problem 732 Mathematical Appendix 739 Solutions to Selected Problems 759 Glossary 781 Index 789
DAVID BESANKO is the Alvin J. Huss Distinguished Professor of Management and Strategy at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. He received his AB in Political Science from Ohio University in 1977, his MS in Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences from Northwestern University in 1982. Before joining the Kellogg faculty in 1991, Professor Besanko was a member of the faculty of the School of Business at Indiana University from 1982 to 1991. In addition, in 1985, he held a post-doctorate position on the Economics Staff at Bell Communications Research. Professor Besanko teaches courses in the fields of Management and Strategy, Competitive Strategy, and Managerial Economics. In 1995, the graduating class at Kellogg awarded Professor Besanko the L.G. Lavengood Professor of the Year, the highest teaching honor a faculty member at Kellogg can receive. RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM is the Harvey Kapnick Professor of Business Institutions in the Department of Economics at Northwestern University. He is Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences. He received a BS in Petroleum Engineering from the University of Tulsa in 1970 and then attended Stanford University and the California Institute of Technology, and he has also held an appointment as a Senior Research Fellow at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (Science Center Berlin). He has also worked in both government and industry, beginning his career as a petroleum engineer with Standard Oil of Indiana (now BP), serving as research economist in The White House office of Telecommunications Policy, and as an economic consultant to Congress, many government agencies and private firms on matters of pricing, costing, managerial strategy, antitrust, and regulation.