Acknowledgments
Introduction: Tarrying on the Path to Knowledge
1. Recollection and the Beginning of Inquiry in the Meno and
Phaedo
2. Another Look at the Beginning Problem
3. Nonphilosophers and Beauty Itself in the Meno and the Phaedo
4. Nonphilosophers and Beauty Itself in Republic V
5. Doxastic Structure at Symposium 201d1–212c3
6. Doxa, Ignorance, and False Judgment in the Phaedrus and
Theaetetus
7. Opining Beauty Itself in Republic V
8. Doxa, Ignorance, and the Consolation of the Lover of Sights and
Sounds
9. Doxa and Ignorance in the Cave and the Divided Line Conclusion:
What Doxa Opines and What Ignorance Is
Bibliography
Index Locorum
Subject Index
Naomi Reshotko is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Denver. She is the author of Socratic Virtue: Making the Best of the Neither-Good-Nor-Bad.
"…Reshotko's book is clearly written, persuasively argued, and a
fine addition to mainstream Plato scholarship." — CHOICE
"Does Plato hold that some contact with the Forms is presupposed by
all human thought, as his famous doctrine of recollection seems to
entail? Or does he reserve such contact for the elite philosophers,
as he seems to argue in the Republic? Reshotko’s book gives the
first option a defense that is both compelling and provocative.
Through lucid argument, careful readings of the dialogues, fruitful
engagement with recent scholarship, and stimulating dialogue with
modern theories of reference, she presents an exciting study of
Plato’s epistemology that will change the way we think of his views
of thought, belief, opinion, recollection, and knowledge." —
Jessica Moss, New York University
"There has been a great deal of scholarship on what knowledge
(epistēmē) means for Plato and how philosophers are supposed to
achieve and apply it. Far less scholarship exists on Plato's view
of non-philosophers and lesser cognitive states such as ignorance
and belief (doxa). Opining Beauty Itself, fills this gap by
offering a sustained discussion on belief and the cognitive
condition of non-philosophers. One could reasonably believe that
the very concept of a Form would be beyond a non-philosopher;
however, Naomi Reshotko fashions a careful, novel, and fascinating
argument that non-philosophers are (unwittingly) thinking about the
Forms, and thus provides a more optimistic outlook for
non-philosophers." — Nicholas Baima, Florida Atlantic
University
"Reshotko's project helpfully broadens our focus of Plato's
epistemology on features that fall short of knowledge including
reference, inquiry, learning, belief, opinion, reasoned belief,
true and false belief, and ignorance. In doing so, she focuses on
some of the most fascinating and perplexing passages in the
Platonic corpus concerning the paradox of inquiry, the theory of
recollection, the nature of philosophers, the ascent in the
Symposium, the possibility of false belief, and the famous images
of the divided line and the cave. Anyone interested in these
passages or their epistemological implications broadly construed
will find Reshotko's provocative and wide-ranging book worth
reading." — Hugh H. Benson, Emeritus Professor, University of
Oklahoma
"The sustained investigation of doxa ('belief' or 'opinion') opens
a new avenue for exploring Plato’s epistemology. Reshotko gives
penetrating arguments for provocative conclusions, conclusions that
give us original interpretations of Plato’s accounts of inquiry,
recollection, and understanding. There is a wealth of helpful
references both to other philosophical interpretations of Plato and
to contemporary theories of reference." — George Rudebusch,
Northern Arizona University
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