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Personal Identity
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Table of Contents

Preface 1. An Initial Survey 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Constitutive and evidential criteria 1.3 The bodily criterion 1.4 The brain criterion 1.5 The physical criterion 1.6 Objections to the physical criterion 1.7 The memory criterion 1.8 The psychological continuity criterion 1.9 The circularity criterion 1.10 The reduplication criterion 1.11 The revised psychological continuity criterion 1.12 The multiple occupancy thesis 1.13 The simple view 1.14 The determinacy thesis 1.15 What matters in survival 1.16 Parfit's argument 2. Locke 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Principium Individuationis 2.3 Substantial identity 2.4 Plants, animals and men 2.5 Personal identity and consciousness 2.6 'Person': a forensic term 2.7 Consciousness 2.8 A much debated passage 3. Leibniz, Butler and Reid 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Discourse on metaphysics 3.3 The New Essays 3.4 Butler and Reid 3.5 The circularity objection 3.6 The Butler-Reid-Shoemaker 3.7 Conclusion 4. Hume 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Our idea of identity 4.3 The reification of perceptions 4.4 Of soul and self 4.5 The source of the mistake 4.6 Objections to Hume 4.7 Conclusion 5. Identity and Personal Identity 5.1 Introduction 5.2 A puzzle 5.3 A solution 5.4 An alternative solution 5.5 The simple and complex views 5.6 Reductionism and non-reductionism 5.7 Persons as endurers or persons as perdurers? 6. Identity and Determinacy 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The determinacy thesis 6.3 Types of indeterminacy 6.4 Indeterminacy as semantic indecision 6.5 The epistemic view 6.6 Indeterminacy and identity over time 6.7 Fuzzy objects 6.8 Indeterminacy and brain transplants 6.9 Indeterminacy and Methuselah 6.10 The determinacy thesis and personal perdurance 6.11 Objections to personal perdurance 6.12 Inconstancy in modal predication 6.13 Conclusion 7. The Reduplication Problem 7.1 Introduction: The generality of the argument 7.2 The only x and y principle 7.3 The ship of Theseus 7.4 An alternative argument 7.6 Further objections 7.7 A counter argument countered 7.8 Cambridge change 7.9 The only x and y principle reformulated 7.10 The multiple occupancy thesis 7.11 Conclusion 8. Quasi-Memory 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The circularity objection 8.3 Quasi-memory 8.4 Quasi-memory and privileged access 8.5 The content of quasi-memory 8.6 M-connectedness and personal identity 9. Parfit and What Matters in Survival 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Identity and survival 9.3 What does matter 9.4 Fission and survival 9.5 Assessment of the argument 9.6 Anti-Parfit 9.7 The only x and y principle revisited 9.8 Parfitian survival and trivial facts 10. The Self and the Future 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Two puzzle cases 10.3 Body-switching? 10.4 Mind-swapping? 10.5 Identity and determinacy 10.6 Conclusion 11. Persons, Animals and Human Beings 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The transplant intuition 11.3 Rejection of the transplant intuition 11.4 The hybrid view 11.5 The too many minds objection

Reviews

"review for first edition: Noonan writes with exceptional clarity, has a masterful command of the issues and of the literature, and is judicious, acute and clear-headed in his analysis and criticisms of arguments and positions."
-Times Literary Supplement
"Well informed and sophisticated discussion....Very rewarding and challenging."
-Mind
..."an ideal source book for those seeking a rigorous but accessible introduction to the topic. Noonan's discussions are fair and accurate, and his criticisms are often well-placed. Highly recommended."
-Choice

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