Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements
1: Intuitions in Philosophy: Overview and Taxonomy
Part I: The Argument from 'Intuition'-Talk
Introduction to Part I
2: 'Intuitive', 'Intuitively', 'Intuition', and 'Seem' in English
3: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (I): A Defective Practice and the Verbal Virus Theory
4: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (II): Some Strategies for Charitable Interpretation
Appendix to Chapter 4: Williamson on Intuition as Belief and Inclination to Believe
5: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (III): Against the Explaining Away of Intuitions
Part II: The Argument from Philosophical Practice
Introduction to Part II
6: Centrality and Philosophical Practice
7: Diagnostics for Intuitiveness
8: Case Studies
9: Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections, and Comparison to Williamson
10: Conceptual Analysis and Intuitions
11: A Big Mistake: Experimental Philosophy
Bibliography
Index

About the Author

Herman Cappelen is a professor of philosophy at the University of St Andrews, where he works at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre. He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He is the author of many papers and three books: Insensitive Semantics (with Ernest Lepore), Language Turned on Itself (with Ernest Lepore), and Relativism and Monadic
Truth (with John Hawthorne).

Reviews

`a wonderfully clear, largely well-argued case against a central assumption of many contemporary metaphilosophers ... I highly recommend it.'
Daniel Cohnitz, Disputatio
`engaging and exciting ... Philosophy Without Intutions represents a clear jolt to contemporary metaphilosophical orthodoxy. It is a vivid and powerful call for philosophers to examine their assumptions about philosophy. Anyone interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy or the proper description of contemporary philosophical practice will benefit from studying it.'
Jonathan Ichikawa, International Journal for Philosophical Studies
`an excellent contribution to the ongoing debate'
Stephen Ingram, Metaphilosophy