1. Institutions and political corruption: a framework; 2. Institutional design and the case for mechanism-based analysis; 3. Ballot structure, political corruption, and the performance of proportional representation; 4. An approach to overcoming the fundamental problem of inference in corruption studies; 5. Political career paths in the bureaucracy and the use of institutional resources in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile; 6. Conclusion.
This book examines how the structure of electoral institutions may affect political corruption.
Daniel W. Gingerich is Assistant Professor of Politics specializing in comparative politics at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. He received his PhD from Harvard University, Massachusetts and has held fellowships in Princeton University's Center for the Study of Democratic Politics and the Inter-American Development Bank's Visiting Scholar's Program. Professor Gingerich's research focuses on understanding the causes and consequences of corruption and clientelism in Latin America as well as developing new methodologies to study these phenomena. He has published various articles in journals such as Political Analysis, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Theoretical Politics. His scholarship has been funded by organizations such as the National Science Foundation.
'Gingerich's book is a valuable addition to studies on corruption
and serves as an excellent example of high-quality institutional
analysis. By showing that ballot structure affects corruption, he
demonstrates that institutions affect the outcome of interest
through different mechanisms. Assessing their overall impact,
therefore, requires taking all of them into consideration.
Gingerich collected new data for the book and offers what is
probably the most sophisticated treatment of corruption I have seen
in the comparative literature. The chapter 'Institutional Design
and the Case for Mechanism-Based Analysis' is the best exposition I
have ever seen of what comparative institutional analysis should
be. This is a great book!' José Cheibub, Boeschenstein Professor of
Political Economy and Public Policy, University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign
'Political corruption is the art of stealing the money of citizens
to win their vote. Daniel W. Gingerich provides brilliant portraits
of how these two activities are connected, writing with both great
precision and flair about how bureaucratic recruitment and ballot
designs shape the fate of political incumbents. With an impressive
design that combines case studies, formal models, and survey data,
Gingerich's book is both substantively important and a blueprint of
how to conduct research in political science today.' Ernesto Calvo,
University of Maryland
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