Table of Contents

List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; List of acronyms; 1. Introduction; 2. Building a better model of bureaucratic control; 3. Administration by regulation; 4. Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control; 5. Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests; 6. The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint; 7. Regulating hybrids: structure and control; 8. Conclusion; Appendix: background of organizations studied; Interview subjects; References; Index.

Promotional Information

A study of the implications of delegating public policy to quasi-government.

About the Author

Jonathan G. S. Koppell is Assistant Professor of Politics, Policy and Organization at the Yale School of Management, Yale University.

Reviews

'There is much of interest in the issues explored by the book and there is a considerable amount of evidence about the cases presented.' Journal of Public Administration 'This book provides a timely study of an important administrative and political phenomenon.' International Institute of Administrative Sciences 'In bringing our attention to a significant but overlooked segment of the federal bureaucracy, Koppell brings a fresh perspective to the literature on democratic accountability of administrative institutions. Two findings in particular - that there is variation from one setting to the next in the fundamental agency control challenge faced by elected officials, and that agencies are strategically sophisticated actors in the policy arena - mark distinct advances in the literature on control of the bureaucracy.' David C. Nixon, Georgia State University