Part I. Preliminaries 1: Introduction 2: Games and Misdemeanors: Game Theory for the Uninitiated 3: Individual Rationality Part II. Society 4 Part III. The State 5: Law and Economics 6: Power and Coercion 7: On Advising Government 8: The Concept of State Part IV. Ethics and Judgment 9: Interpersonal Comparisons 10: Consequentialism and Rights Part V. Conclusion 11: Some Concluding Remarks Appendix. Notes on Methodology: Various and Sundry
Professor of Economics and holds the C. Marks Chair at the
Department of Economics, Cornell University. He has previously been
Distinguished Visitor, London School of Economics (1993), Visiting
Professor at the Department of Economics, Princeton University
(1989-91), Member, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
(1985-86) and Professor, Delhi School of Economics (1985-94). He is
a Fellow of the Econometric Society and a recipient of the
Mahalanobis Memorial
Award for contributions to economics. In 1981-2 he was CORE fellow
at CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. He has published extensively in
the areas of development economics, game theory, social choice
and
welfare and industrial organization theory.
http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/kb40/
`In sum we have a curious book. The intelligence and clarity of the
author can never be faulted. Ideas are at the forefront, not
technique. The book is often highly original, but the first half is
strictly derivative. Nonetheless there are nw ideas of value, most
of all about the state. I would have been happier had the author
started at the truly new, focused on that, developed it, and thrown
out the rest. That disappointment, however, is outweighed by
the
rare pleasure of receiving something conceptual and substantive,
rather than receiving nothing.'
Tyler Cowen, Economics and Philosophy, 2002
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