1: Introduction 2: Meta-ethics Part One: The case against atheism 3: Cosmological Arguments 4: Teleological Arguments 5: Mysticism 6: Ontological Arguments Part Two: The case against benevolent theism 7: Arguments from Scale 8: Arguments from Evil 9: Religious Diversity 10: Immortality Part Three: Ananthropocentric Purposivist Morality 11: A Dialogue 12: Human Well-being 13: Ananthropocentric Purposivist Moral Theory Bibliography Index
Tim Mulgan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland, and Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. He was educated at the Universities of Otago and Oxford, and is the author of The Demands of Consequentialism (OUP, 2001), Future People (OUP, 2006), Understanding Utilitarianism (Acumen, 2007), and Ethics for a Broken World (Acumen/McGill-Queens University Press, 2011).
This book is a great success. * Stephanie Rennick, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy *
"This book has expanded my philosophical horizons in substantial ways, offering an incredibly original, provocative, and unified account of the nature of reality and of value from within the Western tradition. I will not view debates about cosmology and about ethics the same way again. In a nutshell, Tim Mulgan argues for a third alternative that stands "in between" atheism and monotheism. ... his book is complex, intricate, and intelligible, and I also think it is beautiful. It is extraordinarily wide-ranging ... a work of brave and exhilarating philosophy." * Thaddeus Metz, Ethics *
"ground-breaking, far-reaching, and carefully-argued ... I cannot possibly do justice to the range and subtlety of his many arguments ... We should, therefore, pay careful attention to this intriguing contribution to the field" * Joshua W. Seachris Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
"Mulgan has written a magnificent book that deserves serious engagement." * Olli-Pekka Vainio, ESSSAT *
"Mulgan's project is both important and ambitious and his method is admirable" * Peter Forrest, Philosophical Quarterly *