Table of Contents

Introduction
1: Epistemic Appraisal
2: The Egocentric Predicament and Normativity
3: Excusability
4: Rational Disagreement
5: Perspectivalism and Optionalism
6: From Schema to Theory: The Role of Autonomy in the Theory of Rationality
7: Conclusion
A: Reducing Personal to Doxastic Justification
B: Reducing Doxastic to Propositional Justification
Index
Bibliography

About the Author

Jonathan L. Kvanvig is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, having held previous faculty positions at the University of Notre Dame, Texas A&M University, and the University of Missouri. His scholarly activities focus in metaphysics & epistemology and philosophy of religion, including related topics in philosophy of language and philosophy of logic, with thirteen books and over one hundred articles published. He is the editor
of the prestigious Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. He has received grants from the NEH and the Templeton Foundation for scholarly activities, and is the recipient of distinguished research awards from
Texas A&M and Baylor.

Reviews

Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through researchers/faculty.
*Choice*

Rationality and Reflection highlights some important -- and, to my mind, entirely correct -- desiderata for a theory of rationality. Kvanvig's theory offers an interesting way to accommodate those desiderata, and provides a new setting in which current debates can play out.
*Sophie Horowitz, Mind*