Introduction
1. The Korean War: Rational but Failed War of Reunification
2. The Second Korean War: Mix of Rational and Irrational
Choices
3. The 1976 Ax Murders: Rational Miscalculation at Panmunjom
4. Export of Terror in the 1980s: Redux of Rational and Irrational
Choices
5. The Arduous March during the 1990s: Rational Use of
Diplomacy
6. The Era of Axis of Evil: Rational Use of Nuclear Threats and
Diplomacy
7. The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island Attacks: The Rational Use of
Force
8. The New Byungjin Line: Nuclear ICBM-First Politics
9. Limited War of Legitimacy: August 2015 Landmine Incident
Conclusion: Comparative Assessment of Kims’ Rationality and Policy
Implications
David W. Shin is associate professor at the National Intelligence University (NIU) in Bethesda, Maryland.
This is a timely and interesting study of ‘rationality’ of North
Korean leadership. Innovative in analytical construct, excellent in
selection of cases, rigorous in empirical analysis, and rich in
policy implications. Strongly recommended for those who are
interested in North Korea and international relations of Northeast
Asia.
*Chung-in Moon, Distinguished University Professor, Yonsei
University*
Ask a Question About this Product More... |