Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Instrumentalism about Practical Reason 2. In Some Sense Good 3. Medieval and Modern 4. Pleasure 5. Fit 6. Use 7. The Standard Picture of Practical Reason 8. Ethics Appendix A: Anscombe's Argument Appendix B: Anscombe's Objection to Donald Davidson Appendix C: A Note about Kant and Befitting-Style Desirability Characterizations Appendix D: Moral Actions, Virtuous Actions, Expressive Actions Appendix E: Some Notes about the Standard Picture and Formal Work Notes Bibliography Index
It is sometimes better in philosophy not to allow oneself to be distracted by a range of possible objections to this or that aspect of a complex theory that one is developing, but instead to restrict oneself to articulating it as fully and adequately as possible, so that it becomes available as an object of critical discussion. And here Vogler has performed magnificently, drawing first upon Elizabeth Anscombe's for too long unjustly neglected Intention, and supplementing it with arguments that elucidate the notion of a desirability-characterization. She makes excellent use both of Aquinas's three-fold division of good and of some of his discussions of vice and of pleasure. She develops the notion of the benefiting in a way that makes it highly relevant to contemporary discussions. And she elaborates an unusually interesting theory about why and how practical reason has to be calculative. What we are given is a distinctive, well-argued, in some key respects original and beautifully written account of practical reason. I cannot imagine anyone who has involved her or himself in this area of enquiry who would not find it profitable reading, even if it only moved them to redefine and to sharpen their disagreements with the positions taken by the author. It is a very enjoyable book to read. -- Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame Vogler's work is held together by one central idea: the threefold division of the good, which is supposed to provide a universally applicable framework for the study of every kind of practical consideration. Within the tradition of those moral contemporary philosophers who are inspired by the three A's (Aristotle, Aquinas, Anscombe), Vogler is conspicuous for strictly separating the moral from the rational. Vogler's work is an original contribution to the contemporary discussion of practical rationality, and has important points to make that the reader will certainly not find elsewhere. -- Anselm Winfried Muller, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Trier
Candace Vogler is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago.
Vogler (philosophy, Univ. of Chicago) here defends what she terms the "standard view" of practical reasoning. To reason practically, according to this position, is to attempt to fit means to an end, or "parts of an activity in order to do the whole." Many contemporary philosophers have objected that this doctrine artificially separates reason and desire, making reason purely instrumental to desires that cannot be rationally evaluated. Vogler responds with a distinction: the standard view does not depend on controversial psychological premises, such as a bifurcation of reason and desire. Quite the contrary, it rests on a conceptual analysis of action. In carrying out her analysis, Vogler relies extensively on Aquinas's discussion of evil. Her account has the consequence that immoral action need not be irrational: an evil person can pursue his or her ends without manifesting a defect in rationality. Vogler shows a thorough knowledge of modern philosophers, such as Donald Davidson and Philippa Foot, who have discussed practical reason. Her subtle book is bound to be influential. Recommended for academic libraries.-David Gordon, Bowling Green State Univ., OH Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information.
Vogler...here defends what she terms the "standard view" of practical reasoning. To reason practically, according to this position, is to attempt to fit means to an end, or "parts of an activity in order to do the whole." Many contemporary philosophers have objected that this doctrine artificially separates reason and desire, making reason purely instrumental to desires that cannot be rationally evaluated. Vogler responds with a distinction: the standard view does not depend on controversial psychological premises, such as a bifurcation of reason and desire. Quite the contrary, it rests on a conceptual analysis of action...Vogler's subtle book is bound to be influential. -- David Gordon Library Journal 20021201 In this refreshing defense of a theory that many have taken potshots at over the years, Vogler makes a sustained argument that viciousness, although morally deplorable, is not a violation of practical reason. -- W. F. Desmond Choice 20030901 Bravely, and with rather touching regret, [Vogler] sets herself against much current moral philosophy and shows just how difficult it is to avoid internalism if one is persuaded by the standard picture. In doing so, she challenges non-calculative theorists to pay closer attention to the structure of action and practical reason before they can hope to lay to rest the ghost of the reasonable villain. -- Samantha Vice Times Literary Supplement 20040206