Acknowledgments vi List of Maps vii Part I Rome in Contact with the Greek East, 230?205 BC 1 1 Roman Expansion and the Pressures of Anarchy 3 2 Rome and Illyria, ca. 230?217 bc 29 3 Rome, the Greek States, and Macedon, 217?205 bc 77 Part II The Power-Transition Crisis in the Greek Mediterranean, 207?200 BC 119 4 The Pact Between the Kings and the Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean State-System, 207?200 bc 121 5 Reaction: Diplomatic Revolution in the Mediterranean, 203/202?200 bc 181 6 Diplomatic Revolution in the Mediterranean, II: The Roman Decision to Intervene, 201/200 bc 230 Part III From Hegemonic War to Hierarchy, 200?170 BC 271 7 Hegemonic War, I: Rome and Macedon, 200?196 bc 273 8 Hegemonic War, II: Rome and Antiochus the Great, 200?188 bc 306 9 Hierarchy and Unipolarity, ca. 188?170 bc 342 Bibliography 382 Index 402
Arthur M. Eckstein is a specialist in the history of Roman imperialism. He has published three books, Senate and General: Individual Decision-Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264?194 BC (1987), Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius (1995), Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War and the Rise of Rome (2006), and 50 major scholarly articles. He is also co-editing an edition of Polybius' Histories.
"A strength of Eckstein s volume is the balance ofinternational relations theory with the detailed history of thetransformation of the Hellenistic multipolar anarchy from the FirstIllyrian War to the period of Roman unipolarity . Thisconsolidates the placement of political theory within currenthistoriography of the interstate relations of the mid- Republic andHellenistic world. Based on the reception of IR Realism in thevarious studies cited here which have engaged directly orperipherally with Eckstein s volume, there are two majorideas for which he argues that are already working their waythrough the ancient historical consciousness: that fear, threat,force and violence underpin interstate discourses and werecommonplace in the experiences and strategies of both primary andsecondary polities; and that all polities were stakeholders ininternational relations, with neither Roman (or others )ambivalence preventing their participation, nor secondarystates comparative weakness limiting their determination tojoin the negotiation of conflict. We shall in future see much morescholarship based upon these two central arguments." (Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 7 May 2013)